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Abstract
While innovation in inter-domain routing has re-
mained stagnant for over a decade, Internet Exchange
Points (IXPs) are consolidating their role as econom-
ically advantageous interconnection points for reduc-
ing path latencies and exchanging ever increasing
amounts of traffic. As such, IXPs appear as a natural
place to foster network innovation and assess the ben-
efits of Software-Defined Networking (SDN), a recent
technological trend that has already boosted innova-
tion within data-center networks.
In this paper, we give a comprehensive overview
of use cases for SDN at IXPs, which leverage the
superior vantage point of an IXP to introduce ad-
vanced features like load-balancing and DDoS mit-
igation. We discuss the benefits of SDN solutions
by analyzing real-world data from one of the largest
IXPs. We also leverage insights into IXP operations
to not only shape benefits for members but also for
operators.
1 Introduction
The growth of demands for high performance online
services is posing tremendous challenges on the inde-
pendent networks, i.e., Autonomous Systems (ASes),
that carry the traffic of these services and form the
Internet. Pressing requirements, such as lower la-
tencies and higher bandwidth, have pushed ASes to
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move from the strict hierarchical, transit-based in-
terconnection model of the early commercial Internet
towards a denser and flatter structure.
Internet eXchange Points (IXPs) are playing a
leading role during this transition phase by provid-
ing a simple layer 2 broadcast domain to which mem-
bers connect and exchange IP traffic, possibly with
any other member (see Figure 1 left). After estab-
lishing peering relationships, IXP members exchange
routing information by means of the Border Gate-
way Protocol (BGP), the de-facto standard inter-
domain routing protocol. IXPs have become cen-
tral to the Internet peering ecosystem by attracting
increasing numbers of members and, consequently,
traffic. Nowadays, about 80% of the address space is
reachable through more than 350 existing IXPs [1].
The largest IXPs interconnect hundreds of ASes and
carry traffic volumes comparable to those of Tier 1
transit providers [2].
Over a decade of work has gone into proposing
modifications to the BGP routing control plane to
improve its security and make it easier to manage and
troubleshoot [3]. As these proposals require substan-
tial global changes in BGP, unfortunately there has
been no significant adoption. As such, inter-domain
routing still suffers from well-known shortcomings of
BGP such as its coarse-grained control of traffic based
on just destination IP prefixes, and indirect control
of how remote networks forward traffic.
As others have argued [4], we also deem IXPs are
an ideal place to spur innovation in the Internet
ecosystem. First, IXPs are convergence points for
a large number of ASes. Any improvement that can
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Figure 1: The evolution from a traditional IXP fabric to a richer SDN-enabled IXP: i.e., a Software-Defined
eXchange (SDX). The SDX exposes APIs to IXP members through which they can consume advanced
services. For compatibility, IXP members exchange routes using BGP via a route server. Applications
establish high-level policies and behaviors for the underlying IXP fabric. The SDX Controller mediates
access to the programmable IXP fabric and exposes monitoring information.
be deployed at a large IXP has direct impact on hun-
dreds of members. Second, IXPs’ physical networks
are fairly limited in size. This eases any physical mi-
gration towards novel network architectures and in-
frastructure. Third, IXPs are interested in offering
services that go beyond simple layer 2 connectivity.
To simplify peering, many IXPs already operate route
servers, which allow IXP members to peer with many
other ASes via a single BGP session to a route server.
Finally, IXPs have strong economic incentives to em-
brace innovation for reducing the operating costs in
face of continuous traffic growth in their networks.
Software-Defined Networking (SDN) recently
emerged as a new paradigm that enables network
programmability to facilitate management and
enhance flexibility [5]. SDN supports logically
centralized control of a collection of programmable
switches that can act on traffic at a fine level of
granularity. In contrast, BGP, which has been the
standard for exchanging inter-domain reachability
information for decades, only provides limited and
indirect control knobs to network operators. BGP
operates at a coarse-grained level based on IP
destination prefixes. Despite of the SDN potential,
its success has been so far restricted to environments
such as intra-domain routing and data-centers [6].
In this paper, we advocate that IXPs offer an excit-
ing opportunity for inter-domain networking to ben-
efit from the advantages of SDN deployment in neu-
tral, dense environments; thus giving rise to the con-
cept of Software-Defined eXchanges (SDXes). By
looking at real data from one of the largest IXPs,
we demonstrate the need of enhanced network capa-
bilities. Further, we show the potential benefits of
SDXes by presenting use cases. We advance exist-
ing work [4, 7–9] by proposing use cases that benefit
not only the IXP members but also the IXP manage-
ment itself. Also, we show evidence of the need of
a breakthrough in network management at the IXP.
We believe that SDN programmability and its finer-
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grained control capabilities at large IXPs will lead to
novel peering arrangements, greater responsiveness,
and easier network management.
The work presented in this paper is part of an on-
going effort within the ENDEAVOUR project1, a re-
search and innovation action funded by the European
Union’s Horizon 2020 program, which began in Jan-
uary 2015. By focusing on SDN deployment at IXPs,
the project aims to create a flexible SDN ecosystem,
which can support a service marketplace composed of
Cloud/data-centers, networked applications, and the
underlying interconnection fabric.
Figure 1 depicts the architectural evolution that we
envision as IXPs transition to SDN. At the data plane
level, programmable SDN switches forward traffic ac-
cording to fine-grained forwarding and filtering rules
generated by the control plane (i.e., the SDX Con-
troller) in accordance to declarative high-level goals
established by applications. In this scenario, a num-
ber of different applications can be instantiated to ac-
complish various use cases (e.g., Traffic Engineering,
Advanced Blackholing). The SDX controller then
translates these goals in well-defined rules and pro-
grams the underlying data plane through the south-
bound interface, e.g., OpenFlow.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we provide an overview of those customized
applications, including fine-grained traffic engineer-
ing (Sec. 2.1.1), mitigation of Denial-of-Service (DoS)
attacks (Sec. 2.1.2), broadcast message reduction
(Sec. 2.2.1), layer 2 label switching (Sec. 2.2.2), and
other emerging use cases (Sec. 2.3). Section 3 dis-
cusses some of the challenges and the road ahead for
SDXes, and finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 Use-Cases
This section presents some of the benefits we believe
an SDX approach brings to the current generation of
IXPs from both operators’ and members’ perspective.
1https://www.h2020-endeavour.eu/
2.1 IXP Member’s Benefits
2.1.1 Traffic Engineering
Traffic-Engineering (TE) refers to the steering of
traffic flows by network operators to improve perfor-
mance. Achieving these goals depends on the accu-
racy of the network state estimation, the algorithms
used to compute the optimal routing paths, and the
specific features of the routing scheme adopted (e.g.,
per-destination routing, hash-based load balancing).
At an IXP, ASes exchanging large traffic vol-
umes connect with multiple ports (e.g., multiple
100GE). These ASes employ TE to load-balance traf-
fic through these ports and avoid congestion while
attaining high port bandwidth utilization. The out-
come of the TE operations is the result of the inter-
play between the inbound TE policies of the traffic
receiver and the outbound TE policies of the origina-
tor. While the inbound policies specify what type of
traffic can be received through each port alongside in-
formation about the route used to forward that traf-
fic, outbound policies involve a mechanism to com-
pute where to send the originated traffic.
Well-known limitations of BGP hinder what TE
goals network operators can achieve. Operators must
resort to indirect BGP configuration mechanisms,
e.g., AS path prepending, communities, and selective
announcements. It remains to hope that configura-
tion changes have the desired effect, e.g., incoming
traffic is evenly split among the IXP member ports.
Certain types of control are simply not possible. This
problem is particularly acute at IXPs where the wide
range of independent and inconsistent peering poli-
cies might clash. The lack of network programma-
bility poses an additional problem that can lead to
human mistakes and reduces AS responsiveness to
network events.
Despite the aforementioned pitfalls of current so-
lutions, TE is widely performed by IXP members.
Figure 2 shows how members with multiple ports
(roughly 15% of the IXP members) load-balance their
inbound traffic across them. Each IXP member is de-
picted by a vertical bar and the partitioning within
the same bar representing the relative traffic volume
per port. Observe that 27 out of 103 IXP members
3
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
IXP members with multiple ports
Tr
a
ffi
c 
sh
ar
e 
pe
r p
or
t
Port 1
Port 2
Port 3
Port 4
Figure 2: Inbound traffic load-balancing in a large IXP.
receive more than 99% of the traffic through a single
port, probably using the second one as a backup port.
The remaining members perform inbound TE more
intensively. We advocate that TE operations should
be simplified by means of more intuitive primitives
and easier network programmability.
We believe that SDN substantially enhances TE
operations. First, it allows network operators to ex-
press their TE routing policies with a specification
language that is more fine-grained than the legacy
BGP-based one. Operators can effectively use this
greater expressiveness to effectively steer the flows
of traffic according to layer 2-4 attributes. Second,
to perform TE, IXP members have to estimate their
incoming traffic volumes. IXPs can leverage SDN
monitoring capabilities to provide an interface for
accessing a global coherent view of the state of the
network, which also include incoming traffic volumes
statistics. In addition, TE can directly be outsourced
to the IXP, which applies the policies specified by
the IXP members. Automating TE engineering leads
to less human errors whereas outsourcing the pro-
cess frees IXP member resources. Third, SDN pro-
grammable networks allow operators to choose TE al-
gorithms based on their performance goals and scala-
bility limits. For instance, SDN-based load-balancing
can be performed both in static and dynamic man-
ner. The former leverages weighted hash-based per-
flow load-balancing mechanisms, which is available
in the OpenFlow 1.3 standard. It allows an IXP net-
work to spread the incoming traffic on behalf of the
receiver member without any knowledge of the traf-
fic volumes. The latter enables each IXP member to
further optimize TE whenever the former approach
does not achieve the desired optimization goals, as it
is the case whenever a few large flows of traffic are
hashed to the same port. In that case, fine-grained
monitoring and routing capabilities can be used to
detect and reroute those flows of traffic that cause
traffic unbalances.
2.1.2 Advanced Blackholing
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are a
serious threat to the Internet ecosystem.2 To cope
with this threat some IXPs offer blackholing services
to their members.3 Blackholing in general is a tech-
nique that allows an AS to ask its neighbors to drop
packets destined towards a certain IP prefix. DDoS
attacks, which typically affect a limited number of IP
destination addresses, cannot be mitigated by with-
drawing the BGP announcement of the entire IP pre-
fix that contains the target of the attack, since this
would affect also large portions of legitimate traffic.
With blackholing, an AS first has to detect that it is
receiving malicious traffic targeting a specific small
contiguous set of IP prefixes. To stop the incoming
flow, it sends a special BGP announcement for the
affected IP prefix to its upstream neighbor that orig-
2http://blog.cloudflare.com/the-ddos-that-almost-
broke-the-internet
3www.de-cix.net/products-services/de-cix-
frankfurt/blackholing/
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inates this traffic. Upon receiving such message, each
packet destined to that IP prefix is deflected towards
a dummy MAC address by means of Address Resolu-
tion Protocol (ARP) mechanisms. All packets with
this destination MAC are discarded via layer 2 filter-
ing rules implemented via access control lists at the
IXP switching fabric.
Current blackholing implementations at IXPs are
too coarse-grained [10]. Although AS operators are
capable of filtering on layer 4 ports within their own
ASes, fine-grained blackholing for multiple AS bor-
der routers is severely limited by ACL hardware con-
straints, e.g., due to static nature and limited num-
ber of rules. Also, it does not protect the AS peering
link at the IXP, i.e., it can be overwhelmed and con-
gested. Furthermore, blackholing cannot distinguish
between legitimate and malicious traffic: all packets
destined for the blackholed IP prefix are dropped,
thus disconnecting its upstream networks. To make
things more complex, blackholing lacks programma-
bility and must be manually triggered after the DDoS
attack is detected. Since the AS operators cannot
observe the traffic volumes (e.g., attack termination)
and patterns (e.g., destination port mix), identifying
the beginning and termination of an attack is cum-
bersome.
We envision SDN-enabled blackholing to overcome
those limitations. SDN, and OpenFlow in particular,
allows operators to specify fine-grained drop policies
and eases the blackholing process, hence minimizing
the risk of misconfiguration. Using OpenFlow, ASes
can detect a DDoS attack by monitoring the traffic
properties and define fine-grained drop rules to dis-
card the unwanted packets. The IXP can then pro-
vide an interface, e.g., an API, so that members can
express their very own precise drop rules and have
them automatically implemented when an attack is
detected. The IXP can also provide insights in the
blackholed traffic by monitoring the corresponding
flows through the OpenFlow flow counters.
While some traffic might still be unintentionally
blackholed, OpenFlow rate-limiting capabilities can
alleviate the problem. By limiting the traffic (ac-
cording to specific header fields) towards the attacked
members to a non-critical volume, the legitimate traf-
fic can still stand a chance to reach its destination.
2.2 IXP Operator’s Benefits
2.2.1 Controlling Broadcast
IXPs interconnect member’s routers through a shared
layer 2 broadcast domain. As the scale of IXPs keep
increasing (the biggest IXPs nowdays count more
than 600 members), traditional address resolution
mechanisms that rely on broadcast solutions, e.g.,
ARP or Neighbor Discovery (ND), pose a challenge
for faultless operation and stability. Broadcast pack-
ets are needlessly processed by all the routers con-
nected at the IXP, consuming an excessive amount of
each router’s CPU capacity. Thus, broadcast mitiga-
tion and filtering at the IXP’s edge becomes crucial.
Figure 3 shows an increase of a 10% in the volume of
broadcast traffic (i.e., location discovery) at a large
IXP in only 15 months. This growth continues to
happen in spite of IXPs’ strict rules for the configu-
ration of the members’ routers4 and techniques such
as ARP sponge.5
In contrast to a traditional switch, an SDN switch
by default can drop all packets not matching any of
the installed forwarding rules. IXP operators can
thus program the IXP fabric to solve the problems
exposed above. We observe that the topology of an
IXP fabric is fairly stable over time, with the addition
or removal of members happening on a sufficiently
low frequency. Because the location of all members’
routers is stable and well-known to the IXP opera-
tors, broadcast traffic can be eliminated by just pro-
gramming the switching SDN-enabled fabric to exclu-
sively transport packets to the requested destination
by ARP and ND packets.
2.2.2 Layer 2 Label Switching
Large IXPs, especially those with multiple points of
presence need complex and robust infrastructures to
satisfy members’ requirements, such as robustness
and scalability. These IXPs use a transparent layer 3
infrastructure for internally addressing these require-
4https://www.euro-ix.net/networks/configuration-
samples/
5https://ams-ix.net/technical/specifications-
descriptions/controlling-arp-traffic-on-ams-ix-
platform
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Figure 3: ARP requests and ICMPv6 ND frames per
second at a large IXP.
ments, while providing an emulated layer 2 fabric
to their members.6 Unfortunately, exploiting path
diversity within an IXP fabric remains a problem.
Traditional solutions such as MPLS and VPLS help
but come at the cost of increased complexity. De-
spite multiple recent attempts, the two main stan-
dards bodies, i.e, IEEE 802.1aq7 and TRILL,8 have
not yet converged to a uniquely and universally ac-
cepted solution. As this divergence effectively pre-
cludes the interoperability across vendors, a solution
is required.
We believe that SDN can help to simplify this com-
plexity while preserving the benefits of layer 3 proto-
cols, i.e., leveraging the IXP architecture and reduc-
ing the protocol and management overhead. Fine-
grained label switching capabilities such as those pro-
vided by OpenFlow can be used to route the traffic
efficiently over multiple paths across the switching
fabric. Ingress packets can be matched with installed
flow rules and annotated with a label, either with
an MPLS label or encoded in any arbitrary header
field [7], which shall be removed at the IXP’s egress
interface.
6https://ams-ix.net/technical/ams-ix-
infrastructure/the-ams-ix-mplsvpls-infrastructure
7http://www.ieee802.org/1/pages/802.1aq.html
8http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6325
2.3 Emerging Novel Services
2.3.1 Port-Based Congestion Reporting
Congestion and its management is an essential factor
for an IXP and its members. However, in spite of
experiencing significant and persistent congestion at
multiple peering links, ASes and IXPs have no pri-
mary means of controlling congestion. That is, as
the traffic sources and destinations are beyond its
domain, an IXP cannot rely on the traditional con-
gestion notification mechanisms such as Explicit Con-
gestion Notification (RFC3168).
Nowadays, congestion at the level of a member’s
port is a significant problem. To illustrate, Figure 4
shows our measurements from one of the largest IXPs
during a seven day period, where we monitor using a
5-minute interval the traffic volume flowing from the
IXP into each IXP member’s port. We found that 43
(∼ 6%) out of the 760 IXP member’s ports suffered at
least once from congestion, i.e., more than 100% uti-
lization. Once a member’s egress port reaches 100%
utilization, excess traffic starts filling buffers and is
dropped once buffers are full. By accounting for all
traffic that traverses the IXP, our measurement cap-
ture the severity of this congestion. For instance, a
200 Mbits and a 10 Gbits port experienced traffic
rates at 473% and 214% of their capacity, respec-
tively. Moreover, we found that utilization at 114
ports exceeds 85%.
Empowering IXPs with SDN, and in particular
with OpenFlow capabilities, would ease both the per
port utilization and packet loss monitoring process
for each member. Furthermore, SDN enables highly
dynamic solutions wherein the ASes can be informed
whenever a specific congestion level is reached. For
instance, since version 1.5.1, OpenFlow includes
push-based counters monitoring triggered by prede-
fined thresholds. IXP members could act upon con-
gestion reports and apply different routing policies
based on network conditions.
2.3.2 IXP as Transport Marketplace
IXPs have dynamized peering interconnections by en-
abling ASes to automatically peer through the route
server with those ASes willing to peer with any other
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Figure 4: CDF of port utilization in percent showing
that 43 ports exceed 100% utilization.
network. Furthermore, going beyond their original
goal of being the central place for peering relation-
ships, IXPs have expanded the transport opportuni-
ties. IXPs are frequently interconnected by remote
peering providers, which offer layer 2 transport be-
tween IXPs [1]. This interconnection between IXPs
is frequently directly promoted by the IXPs them-
selves. There is even anecdotal evidence of transit
providers offering their transport services at IXPs.
Building upon this increasing diversity, IXPs could
become a marketplace for transport. Benefiting from
the co-location of ASes, the existing infrastructure
and transparency standards, the IXP could help sup-
ply to meet the demand of transport over the Internet
in all its different flavors.
Despite these developments, current interconnec-
tion practices are still characterized by a cumbersome
and slow contract negotiation process. We believe
that SDN can play a key-role in supporting IXPs to
meet those challenges. As with other SDN applica-
tions, APIs at the IXP can be leveraged to facilitate
the choice of how and whether to interconnect. For
instance, an AS might declare its peering conditions
through the API and all networks meeting them can
automatically peer.
2.3.3 Service Chaining
Increasingly, middleboxes (e.g., firewalls, VPN gate-
ways, proxies, intrusion detection systems, WAN op-
timizers or scrubbers) play a critical role for the per-
formance and security of many networks. Operators
commonly want to chain together multiple middle-
boxes to create a processing path of desired network
functions, also called a network service [11]. Ser-
vice chaining is emerging as an appealing solution
to enable operators to dynamically deploy network
services without having to make hardwire physical
middleboxes. However, using traditional protocols
like BGP or MPLS, service chains are difficult to
deploy and change. Operators must carefully con-
figure protocols to “hijack” wanted traffic and steer
it through the sequence of middleboxes. Moreover,
such mechanisms steer traffic based only on IP des-
tination addresses, limiting the overall service granu-
larity. In competitive markets, with rapid innovation
at the application layer, this limits operators’ ability
to address emerging use cases and business models.
Instead, an SDN approach is a well suited alternative
to enable service chaining given its logically central-
ized management and configurable forwarding rules
at fine granularity. Thus, inter-domain routing con-
vergence points like IXPs appear as promising loca-
tions to deploy service chains.
3 Discussion and Outlook
In the previous section, we presented a selection of
appealing use cases that highlight the potential for
innovation with SDXes. We now turn our discussion
on broad research challenges towards making SDN at
IXPs within grasp.
Scalability. SDXes will interconnect hundreds of
networks and expose rich service APIs. This creates
scalability challenges that will need to be addressed.
For instance, given the size of the global Internet
routing, which counts over 500K IP prefixes, naively
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supporting arbitrary SDN applications may result in
solutions that cannot even cope with the scale of
medium-sized IXPs. Moreover, the growing interest
towards remote peering [1] will pose even more chal-
lenges in designing scalable solutions for large-sized
IXPs. In fact, despite the SDN fine-grained control
capabilities over the traffic, the hardware forwarding
table sizes are a constrained resource. These consid-
erations demand techniques such as those explored in
the iSDX design [7] to efficiently compute and encode
flexible routing policies and to minimize the number
of data plane updates due to changes in inter-domain
reachability information.
Reliability. A recent incident at AMS-IX in May
2015,9 wherein a forwarding loop affected the IXP
for a brief time, demonstrated how configuration mis-
takes or failures can dramatically impact the network.
In this regards, the rise of new applications enabled
by SDN will pose new challenges in ensuring a sta-
ble and reliable network operation. According to a
recent report [12], many experts from the networking
and formal methods communities believe that despite
their importance, tools for programming and reason-
ing about networks are still in a state of infancy. We
believe this also applies to SDXes specifically.
Security. Increased Internet security is a goal
highly sought after and a desired use case by op-
erators, in particular, for detecting and preventing
DDoS. Beyond DDoS mitigation, SDXes might en-
able new architectures that can help address broad
classes of network attacks by design. For example,
these architectures can provide an opportunity to re-
consider the line of research on network capabilities,
where embedding costs into traffic could act as a de-
terrent for attackers [13].
Privacy. SDXes will provide a multitude of ser-
vices beyond a traditional layer 2 interconnection
including network functions (such as caches, opti-
mizers, packet scrubbers) that will be deployed at
SDXes. This raises questions regarding the privacy
of processing traffic at exchanges and the neutrality
9https://ams-ix.net/newsitems/195
of SDXes [14]. Who controls the network functions?
Who specifies what traffic traverses which network
functions? How will it be regulated and what audit-
ing will be performed?
Business Confidentiality. Members will inter-
act with SDXes’ control software through APIs to
consume services. However, the correct or efficient
consumption of these services might require exchange
of information that is traditionally considered pro-
prietary due to its business-critical nature, such as
peering and routing policies. Therefore, new solu-
tions (e.g., see [15]) are needed to align conflicting
objectives such as service consumption while avoiding
leakage of confidential information. This is very chal-
lenging as possible approaches such as secure multi-
party computations might be prohibitively compute
intensive in practical settings. Beyond the techni-
cal solutions, we believe that to a large extent the
problem lies in the vague legal framework for IXP-
data disclosure rather than on whether the IXP is a
reliable partner for neutral information sharing. A
clearer legal framework will definitely help foster in-
novation at IXPs.
Transitioning to SDN. Despite the advantages
that SDN offers for innovating wide-area traffic deliv-
ery, SDXes will require a clear migration path from
existing systems to deploy SDN software and hard-
ware. We observe that a first step has been made to
show the viability of deploying SDN hardware side-
by-side with existing production equipment at a pub-
lic IXPs [16,17], and also best-practices exist for mi-
gration in enterprise data-center, campus [18], and
carrier networks.10 However, actual experience with
production deployments remain limited and research
that further spurs early adoption in operational net-
works will be crucial towards reaching a wide-spread
deployment.
10https://www.opennetworking.org/images/stories/
downloads/sdn-resources/use-cases/Migration-WG-Use-
Cases.pdf
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4 Summary
We explored the benefits of casting SDN concepts
into Internet eXchange Points for fostering innova-
tion in the Internet peering ecosystem. Based on mul-
tiple discussions with operators from the IXP com-
munity and an analysis of data traces from one of
the largest IXP in the world, we illustrated several
use cases that stand to benefit from advanced SDN
capabilities at IXPs. Finally, we discussed open prob-
lems towards reaching the goal of wide-spread SDN
deployment at IXPs.
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